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Heise: Virtues of Passive Dialogue

PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE VIRTUES OF PASSIVE DIALOGUE
by
Michael Heise*

I. INTRODUCTION
The judicial, legislative, and executive branches interact in many ways. These
interactions fuel a constitutional dialogue that serves as a backdrop to myriad governmental
activities, both large and small.1 Although this on-going dialogue takes numerous forms and its
quality varies, its existence is one sign of a functioning democracy. The judiciary’s participation
in the nation’s constitutional dialogue is necessary, desirable, and, as an empirical matter,
inevitable. The judiciary’s participation raises important normative issues as well. This article
analyzes two competing models that bear on the normative question: what form should the
judiciary’s participation take?
Debates over the judiciary’s appropriate role in the public constitutional dialogue have
captured scholarly attention for decades. Many credit Professor Alexander Bickel’s classic
work, The Least Dangerous Branch,2 for framing much of the modern discussion about the
Court’s proper role in the broader public constitutional dialogue.3 Professor Cass Sunstein’s
more recent call for decisional minimalism4 contributes to a conversation invigorated by Bickel.5

* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. A.B., Stanford University; J.D., University of

Chicago; Ph.D., Northwestern University. This article is a more finished version of a paper I presented at
the University of Akron School of Law Conference on Education and the Constitution. In addition to the
conference participants, Jim Ryan, Ron Krotoszynski, Jr., Dawn Chutkow, and Dan Cole also provided
helpful comments.
1 It goes without saying that participants in the nation’s constitutional dialogue include more than the major
governmental actors and their activities.
2 A LEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS (1962).
3 See generally id.
4 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL M INIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999)
[hereinafter, SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME]. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) [hereinafter, Sunstein, Foreward: Leaving Things Undecided].
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Notably, both Bickel and Sunstein advance theoretical rationales for judicial modesty and
reticence, although they approach the issue from different vantage points and they articulate
different arguments. However, both Bickel and Sunstein agree that a modest or minimalist
approach enhances democratic rule and public discourse by allowing more room for the other
political branches to function. This restrained vision of the Court’s role in the public
constitutional dialogue has lately come under attack6 and recent court decisions suggest it enjoys
mixed doctrinal support.7
Professor Katyal’s recent contribution to this debate argues for something quite
different. Unlike Bickel and Sunstein, Katyal calls for courts to engage actively in the larger
public constitutional dialogue principally by dispensing non-binding advice to political branches
through a variety of mechanisms.8 Through advice-giving, Katyal maintains, the Court “enters
into a conversation with the political branches and embraces its partnership.”9 According to
Katyal, such active judicial dialogic participation will generate enhanced democratic decisionmaking and popular accountability.10
Professor Katyal’s thesis contrasts nicely with the points advanced by Bickel and
Sunstein, and revisits important assumptions about the Court’s proper institutional position
within our constitutional regime. In this article, I explore some of the larger issues surrounding
5 Professor Sunstein correctly notes the “obvious connection” between his work and that of Bickel.

SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 4, at 267 n.5.
6 See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN . L. REV. 1709 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Law
Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 701-02 (1989).
7 For example, according to some commentators the doctrine of desuetude has fallen into relative disuse
over time. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal
Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1448 (1999); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1285 & n.3 (4th ed. 1996). See also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89 (1984) (prohibiting reliance on pendant state grounds); United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty,
445 U.S. 388 (1980) (holding that the expiration of a named plaintiff’s claim does not moot an entire class
action); but see, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997) (“throughout the Nation, Americans
are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physicianassisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.”).
8 See Katyal, supra note 6.
9 Id. at 1711.
10 Id. at 1824.
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the courts’ role in general and Katyal’s thesis in particular. Specifically, I assess Katyal’s
argument from the vantage point of a specific jurisprudence—school finance—and within a
discrete judicial setting—state supreme courts. While this vantage point limits my analysis, it
offers the advantage of keeping the judicial context constant so as to better isolate the
differences that separate the consequences flowing from active and passive judicial postures.
Notably, my test case—school finance litigation—should favor Katyal’s active model.
Court decisions relating to school finance involve state rather than Article III courts, and the
many differences that separate these two systems cut in a direction that makes state court
participation in a constitutional dialogue less threatening to democratic rule. Moreover, school
finance litigation is a timely example of institutional11 or public law12 litigation. Public law cases
present a more inviting opportunity for courts to participate in the broader public dialogue.
Thus, to the extent that active judicial participation in constitutional dialogue yields such soughtafter benefits as enhanced democratic decision-making and increased accountability, these
results should be visible in the school finance context.
School finance decisions provide an especially attractive context in which to compare
competing models of judicial participation in constitutional dialogue for reasons that bear on
research design. Courts in some states quite forcefully influenced school finance remedies and,
by so doing, participated more directly and actively in the constitutional dialogue that
accompanied the issue. In other states, courts only passively engaged in the constitutional
dialogue swirling around them and ceded much of the remedial task to the other political
branches, typically the legislature. The courts’ differing treatment of the remedial portions of

11 See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.

L. REV. 1 (1979).
12 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
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successful13 school finance decisions uncovers potential distinctions between active and passive
judicial engagement.14
Results from a modest comparison of active and passive judicial dialogic engagements in
the school finance context do not bode well for Katyal’s thesis. The benefits predicted in
Katyal’s active model are not readily apparent. In contrast, the costs incurred by a judicial
branch actively engaged in a constitutional conversation with legislative and executive branches
are far clearer. Consequently, the models advanced by Bickel and Sunstein—which promote
passive virtues and judicial minimalism—receive more support than Katyal’s call for active
judicial engagement. At least in the school finance context, active judicial participation appears
to erode rather than enhance democratic rule, and dilute rather than enhance political
accountability. Although I argue that this finding follows for both theoretical and practical
reasons, I do not discuss whether and, if so, how these findings might inform other areas within
education law or beyond.
In Part II of this article, I describe in more detail what I mean by active and passive
judicial participation. Part III considers why the debate about the proper judicial posture within
the larger constitutional dialogue is important and warrants attention. In Part IV, I explain why
my selected case study—school finance decisions by state supreme courts—should favor
Katyal’s active model. Part V explores examples of passive and active judicial activity within
the context of school finance remediation. In conclusion, I consider the implications of school
finance decisions and their support for the passive model, and I identify lines of further research.

II. FORMS OF JUDICIAL DIALOGIC PARTICIPATION

13 By “successful” I mean only to refer to those school finance lawsuits where the plaintiffs successfully

challenged a state’s school finance system on state constitutional grounds.
14 See infra Part II.
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Judicial participation in constitutional dialogue takes various forms and manifests itself in
an array of subtle shades and hues. Despite important and often nuanced distinctions, it remains
possible to characterize two broad forms of judicial participation: passive and active.

A. Passive Judicial Participation
For the narrow purpose of this article, I define “passive participation” to include the
standard use of traditional avenues of judicial participation in constitutional dialogue. Passive
participation can be viewed from two similar, but distinct, vantage points. One involves a
court’s decision to decide a case.15 A second vantage point arises once a court takes a case,
and involves the nature of the court’s opinion.

1. Passive Virtues
Professor Bickel’s important work, The Least Dangerous Branch,16 speaks directly
to the first issue: whether the court should take a case in the first instance. According to Bickel,
courts can pursue three principal avenues: i) invalidate legislation as inconsistent with principle;
ii) validate legislation as consistent with principle; or iii) do neither i nor ii.17 When courts
invalidate or validate legislation, the judicial opinion is the principal tool for doing so. Under
option three, the court actively does nothing or, in Bickel’s words, exercises “passive virtues.”18
The exercise of passive virtues is typically achieved through the use of such judicial doctrines as
standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions, and the exercise of granting certiorari.19
For Bickel, one principal benefit of the judiciary’s exercise of passive virtues is that it
reduces the courts’ entanglement with, and thereby increases its insulation from, political
15 By definition, my reference relates to those appellate courts that enjoy some level of discretionary review.
16 See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 2.
17 Id. at 69.
18 See id. at 115-98.
19 Id. at 169, 117-27.
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issues.20 Of particular concern to Bickel are the ills that flow from a political backlash aimed at
the Court for unpopular decisions or perceived (or real) institutional overreaching.21

2. Decisional Minimalism
Professor Sunstein refines Bickel’s passive virtues thesis by focusing on limiting the
scope of the Court’s use of traditional tools once it has decided to hear a particular case and
address its substantive components. Where Bickel dwells on the Court’s decision to hear a
case, Sunstein’s decisional minimalism22 examines how the Court can exercise self-restraint by
writing narrow opinions in cases that bear on controversial, public issues.23 Sunstein’s
decisional minimalism is exercised when judges write narrow judicial opinions and avoid
articulating through any particular case a broad rule or abstract theory not necessary for the
specific case at bar. Sunstein’s thesis recognizes that the way in which judges use judicial
tools—such as the opinion—can vary, sometimes dramatically.
For Sunstein, decisional minimalism’s principal virtue includes its ability to enhance
democracy by allowing other constitutional branches greater room to maneuver.24 Professor
Sunstein worries less about a need to insulate the Court from possible political fallout than the
need to recognize its comparative institutional disadvantages when it comes to formulating and
advancing policies that sometimes benefit from empirical and social science evidence.25

20 Id.
21 See, e.g., id. at 199-200 (“Exercising a function of this description, however imprecise, in a society

dedicated both to the morality of government by consent and to moral self-government, the Supreme Court
touches and should touch many aspects of American public life. But it would be intolerable for the Court
finally to govern all that it touches, for that would turn us into a Platonic kingdom contrary to the morality of
self-government; and in this world at least, it would not work.”).
22 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 4, at 4.
23 Id. at 4-5.
24 Id. at 4 (“[M]inimalism can promote democracy because it allows democratic processes room to
maneuver.”).
25 Id. at 267-68. See also NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT A LTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
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3. Examples of Passive Judicial Participation
Connecticut’s contraception cases illustrate the salient points of passive virtue.
Connecticut’s anti-birth-control statute was enacted in 1879.26 Earlier efforts to have the
Connecticut Supreme Court strike down the under-enforced statute as unconstitutional proved
unsuccessful. While the Court granted certiorari in both instances, the Court dismissed both
cases on justiciability grounds. In Tileston v. Ullman,27 the Court concluded that the appellant
lacked legal standing to bring the lawsuit. Similarly, the Court concluded, 18 years later in Poe
v. Ullman,28 that the appellant advanced a legal issue that was not ripe because the appellant
failed to demonstrate a “real” threat of prosecution by the state of Connecticut.
Multiple attempts to amend Connecticut’s statute from 1923 demonstrate the political
controversies surrounding the issue at that time.29 According to Bickel, the Court wisely
refrained from prematurely entering this long-simmering political fight and instead sought to
deflect the political fight surrounding reproductive technologies back to the legislature.
That the Court ultimately decided the issue squarely four years later in Griswold v.
Connecticut 30 perhaps owes much to the indefatigable and creative litigation prowess of those
seeking to thrust the Court into an area into which it previously declined to venture. If nothing
else, the Court’s exercise of passive virtues by declining to adjudicate the substantive merits of
the earlier cases bought the Court helpful time while the larger, public constitutional dialogue
gelled around the social and political implications of birth control. The value of this time, during
which other political and social institutions addressed the still controversial (though decidedly

26 See Tileston v. Ullman, 26 A.2d 582, 589 (Conn. 1942).
27 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
28 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
29 See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 143-56.
30 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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less so) issues surrounding birth control,31 is as difficult to over-estimate as it is to quantify with
any accuracy.
In contrast, Sunstein dwells on cases in which the Court undertakes a review of an
underlying constitutional claim and decisions that “leave things open,” “make deliberate
decisions about what should be left unsaid,” and judges that do and say “as little as necessary in
order to justify an outcome.”32 By way of examples, Professor Sunstein points to three recent
and politically charged cases in which the Court decided the particular case in front of it, but did
so in a manner that left open large portions of the larger public debate surrounding an underlying
constitutional question. When the Supreme Court concluded that the publicly-funded Virginia
Military Institute could not exclude women from its cadet corps, the Court pointedly refused to
rule more broadly on the constitutionality of single-gender education institutions.33 When the
Court invalidated an affirmative action program in Richmond, Virginia, the Court refused to rule
conclusively on the larger constitutional question relating to the government’s use of raceconscious programs.34 Finally, when the Court struck down a Colorado law prohibiting
measures banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the Court avoided any
discussion about other possible intersections between sexual orientation and the Constitution.35
The fact that the related controversy and litigation on these three broad issues persist36
underscores that the Court’s decisions in VMI, Croson, and Romer were narrow enough not to

31 The implications of birth control for human rights are one example of birth control’s enduring

controversy. See generally Margaret Plattner, The Status of Women Under International Human Rights
Law and the UN World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, 84 KY. L.J. 1249 (1995-96); Valerie A.
Dormady, Note, Women’s Rights in International Law: A Prediction Concerning the Impact of the United
Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 97 (1997).
32 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 4, at 3.
33 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
34 See Richmond v. J. A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
35 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
36 See, e.g., Jonathan N. Reiter, Note, California Single-Gender Academies Pilot Program: Separate but
Really Equal, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401 (1999) (arguing that California’s single-gender public academies are
constitutional); Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998) (discussing affirmative action); Baker v.
Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (discussing same-sex marriage).
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foreclose further public and legal debate on the larger issues implicated by these particular
cases.

B. Active Judicial Participation
In contrast to the examples of passive judicial participation described above, active
judicial participation involves the use of non-traditional judicial tools, as well as an aggressive
use of the traditional judicial tools available to judges. Through both sets of mechanisms, courts
participate in the public constitutional dialogue by interacting with the legislative and executive
branches in a more robust, direct, and engaged manner.

1. Non-traditional Judicial Tools: Advice-giving
Notwithstanding a strong history and practice to the contrary, 37 Professor Katyal
argues that, in addition to the traditional powers accorded to the federal courts under Article III,
federal courts also enjoy authority to render advice.38 Specifically, he argues that the judiciary
“has used, and should continue to use, a range of interpretative and decision-making techniques
to give advice to the political branches and state governments.”39 Judicial advice can be
advanced either in dicta or through an advisory opinion. Advisory opinions are the more
controversial vehicle. Since the Republic’s earliest days, federal courts generally have declined

37 See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and

Dialogue, 83 M INN. L. REV. 1, 15-23 (1998) (arguing against Article III courts’ issuing advisory opinions).
But see Kaytal, supra note 6, at 1723-53 (arguing that Article III courts possess advisory opinion authority).
38 For purposes of this Article, I will equate the type of judicial advice-giving that Professor Katyal
describes to active judicial participation in the nation’s constitutional dialogue. Katyal writes that, as an
advice-giver a federal judge “enters into a conversation with the political branches and embraces its
partnership.” Katyal, supra note 6, at 1711.
39 Katyal, supra note 6, at 1710. But see Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not be Advicegivers: A
Response to Professor Neal Katyal, 50 STAN . L. REV. 1825 (1998) (arguing that judges lack both the
legitimacy and capacity to serve the democratic process as advicegivers). To be fair, Katyal focuses his
argument on one court--the U.S. Supreme Court--and one form of advice--Constitutional advice. Katyal,
supra note 6, at 1711.
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to issue advisory opinions.40 Of course, state supreme courts’ experiences with advisory
opinions vary, and a minority of state supreme courts have formal advisory opinion
procedures.41
Katyal identifies “exemplification” and “demarcation” as two examples of legal advice
by federal courts. In the former, a court strikes down legislation but suggests to lawmakers a
constitutionally permissible method to achieve the same end. Chief Justice Taft’s opinion in Hill
v. Wallace42 and Justice O’Connor’s decision in New York v. United States43 are examples
of this genre. Demarcation, by contrast, is where the Court upholds legislation as constitutional,
but informs lawmakers that any legislation that ventures any further will trample upon
constitutional protections. Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Washington v.
Glucksburg,44 a right-to-die case, illustrates how one justice draws such lines in advance and
publicly articulates these lines.
2. Aggressive Use of Traditional Tools: Judicial Opinions
An aggressive use of traditional judicial tools—such as the judicial opinion—can
facilitate active judicial participation in constitutional dialogue. One “strong” form of active
judicial dialogue is implicit within Professor Zacharias’ “political effects” model of judicial
activity.45 Under the political effects model, a court would impose liability on a defendant with
an eye toward indirectly prompting legislative and administrative action that might lessen the
need for a general liability rule.46 Professor Zacharias is careful to limit the applicability of his
model and notes that, as a general rule, courts should decide matters of liability solely on the

40 See Krotoszynski, supra note 37, at 16. But see Katyal, supra note 6, at 1723-53.
41 For one historical summary, see Charles M. Carberry, The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective, 44

FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (1975).
42 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
43 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
44 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2310-12 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
45 Fred C. Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698, 699-700 (1986).
46 Id. at 698.
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basis of substantive legal doctrine.47 He also notes that the political effects model assumes—
and indeed depends upon—the idea that legislators, and not judges, are best positioned and
able to address social issues and public policy. 48 However, he goes on to note that legislative
processes are often not sensitive enough to conditions that affect a non-vocal constituency.49
The political effects model comes into play only when “process” concerns prevent a court from
implementing traditional legal analysis that would otherwise generate liability.50 In essence,
Zacharias’ model seeks to have political concerns trump process in those instances where
process trumps substance to the disadvantage of a non-vocal constituency.

3. An Example of Active Participation: Judge Calabresi and the Then Opinion
A celebrated example that illustrates many variants of the active judicial participation
model comes from Judge (and former Professor) Guido Calabresi’s concurring opinion in
United States v. Then.51 In Then, the court struggled with a paradox generated by the
operation of the Sentencing Guidelines [hereinafter “the Guidelines”].52 The Guidelines were
designed partly to generate more continuity for criminal sentences among judges, reduce
variation, and, as a result, increase equity. 53 Pursuant to its statutory instructions, the
Sentencing Commission grouped criminal offenses and defendants into categories, and
established a matrix that generates sentencing ranges determined by such factors as the
seriousness of the crime and the defendant’s criminal history.54
47 Id. at 714.
48 Id. at 714-15.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 714.
51 United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995).
52 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as Chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act

of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987-2034 (1984).
53 Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 W ISC . L. REV. 679, 686-90 (1996).
54 See United States Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements (1987).
According to the Sentencing Guidelines:
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The intersection between the Guidelines and convictions for offenses involving crack
cocaine, especially its racial dimension, generates a “thorny” issue.55 The issue flows from the
Guidelines’ mandate for a 100-to-1 sentencing ratio for crack versus powder versions of
cocaine.56 As Professor Krotoszynski notes, the operative effect of this portion of the
Guidelines is to dramatically increase criminal sentences for those convicted of possessing
comparatively modest amounts of crack cocaine. Defendants convicted of crimes involving
crack cocaine are disproportionately African-American. Accordingly, the issue’s thorniness
relates to the consequence that African-Americans receive disproportionately longer sentences
than non-African-Americans for convictions stemming from cocaine offenses.57
In United States v. Then, the Second Circuit confronted the question of whether the
Guidelines’ disproportionate impact on African-Americans flowing from sentencing distinctions
drawn between varieties of cocaine violated the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection. Consistent with other federal courts, the Second Circuit declined to find a
constitutional violation.58 On this point, the Then decision appears remarkably unremarkable.59
In his concurring opinion, Judge Calabresi reiterated the majority’s conclusion that the
racial disparity did not amount to an equal protection violation. Judge Calabresi rested his

[t]he Federal Sentencing Guidelines are, in a sense, nothing more than a set of instructions
for one chart—the Sentencing Table. The goal of guidelines calculations is to arrive at
numbers for the vertical (offense level) and horizontal (criminal history category) axes on
the Sentencing Table grid, which in turn generate an intersection in the body of the grid.
Each such intersection designates a sentencing range expressed in months.
Id. See also Frank O. Bowman, III, Coping With “Loss”: Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal Economic
Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461, 472-73 (1998). For a readable and concise explanation
of the sentencing guidelines “grid” and the calculation of a sentence under the guidelines, see Bowman,
supra note 53, at 693-704.
55 Krotoszynski, supra note 37, at 10.
56 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(1997). See id. at 10 n.34 for an example of how
this aspect of the Guidelines works.
57 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 364-86 (1997).
58 See, e.g., David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy’s “Politics of
Distinction”, 83 GEO . L. REV. 2547, 2548-49 (1995); David Slansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection,
47 STAN . L. REV. 1283, 1302-03 n.93 (1995).
59 Krotoszynski, supra note 37, at 12.
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analysis principally on the petitioner’s failure to make the case for any intentional animus
harbored by the Sentencing Commission or Congress.60 Again, to this point, Judge Calabresi’s
concurring opinion is wholly unremarkable. It is Judge Calabresi’s next step that is notable. In
his concurrence, Judge Calabresi noted that while the petitioner failed to establish any intent thus
far, from this point forward all bets are off. For as of now, Calabresi notes, the Commission
and Congress are on notice of the racial disparities. Consequently, Judge Calabresi opined that
he could foresee constitutional arguments that were unpersuasive in the past becoming
persuasive in the future.61 Moreover, in light of the evidenced presented in Then, Judge
Calabresi mused that if the Commission or Congress did not recalibrate the Guidelines to blunt
the racial disparity, such legislative inaction alone might be sufficient to satisfy the intent
requirement as articulated in Washington v. Davis.62
Although Judge Calabresi did not ultimately tip his hand and reveal how he might rule,
he was blunt in his assessment that the Guidelines might be “heading toward
unconstitutionality.”63 Moreover, he artfully raised two rhetorical questions that openly begged
for a legislative response.64 Judge Calabresi’s concurring opinion pulls few punches. He
expressly advocates the position that judges should engage in a dialogue with lawmakers and
further notes that “[t]he tradition of courts engaging in dialogue with legislatures is too well
established in this and other courts to disregard.”65
Not surprisingly, Judge Calabresi’s “dialogue” did not go unnoticed by members of his
own panel. To his colleagues on the Second Circuit, Judge Calabresi’s concurrence resembled

60 United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 466-67 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
61 Id.
62 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
63 See Then, 56 F.3d at 469 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
64 Judge Calabresi queried: “Precisely at what point does a court say that what once made sense no longer

has any rational basis,” and “What degrees of legislative action, or of conscious inaction, is needed when
that (uncertain) point is reached?” 56 F.3d at 468-69 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
65 Id. at 467 n.1 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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an advisory opinion.66 The majority in Then emphasized the courts’ more traditional and
appropriate role in the constitutional order, and noted in particular the ordinary practice of
refraining from issuing advisory opinions.67 Indeed, scholars have joined Judge Calabresi’s
judicial colleagues in characterizing his concurring opinion as a “judicial intervention in an
essentially legislative enterprise.”68

III. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF JUDICIAL DIALOGUE
The dilemma is straightforward. Some form of judicial participation in the constitutional
structure is necessary to secure sought-after democratic self-rule. Too much judicial
participation, however, threatens to erode the very end sought. A critical question, then, is how
much judicial participation is too much?
The court’s unique institutional characteristics—notably the appointment of unelected
judges serving life terms—make attention to the court’s role in our public constitutional dialogue
especially important. Among the constitutional actors, the federal courts need to be particularly
prudent in discharging their duties, especially that of judicial review. While the Court’s decision
in Marbury v. Madison69 settled one question surrounding the constitutionality of judicial
review it raised a crucial dilemma: how to reconcile the tension between the principle that the
Constitution reposes sovereign authority in the people, who duly elect their political
representatives, and the principle that the Court possesses the final word over questions about
the political process. Questions about passive and active judicial participation form one piece of
this much larger, complicated puzzle.

66 See Krotoszynski, supra note 37, at 14.
67 56 F.3d at 466 (arguing the court’s role is “limited to interpreting and applying the law that Congress

passes, and striking down those that we conclude are unconstitutional.”).
68 Krotoszynski, supra note 37, at 14.
69 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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One critical dimension to the consideration of the courts’ proper posture in interbranch
constitutional dialogue is the potential impact judicial participation will have on the other
branches and, ultimately, on democratic processes. Specifically, will active, robust court
participation enhance the deliberative processes and thereby advance democratic principles?
Or, in contrast, will active court participation erode or supplant the constitutional duties
allocated to the executive or legislative branches? Not surprisingly, proponents of the active
and passive models disagree on the consequences of these models.

A. Passive Judicial Participation
Advocates of passive participation suggest that efforts to minimize the structural tension
between unelected judges and democratic rule will generate various theoretical and practical
benefits. Much of the theoretical discussion pivots on what Professor Bickel labeled as the
counter-majoritarian difficulty. Many of the Framers harbored deep concerns about the
potential for a judicial branch wholly insulated from direct political accountability which, in turn,
could generate a tyrannical superlegislature.70 The judiciary’s structure, along with the Article
III courts’ activities, stress traditional notions of political legitimacy. This stress is greater with
active rather than passive judicial participation in the nation’s constitutional dialogue.
Threats to political legitimacy flow from multiple sources. Federal judges are unelected,
enjoy a life tenure, benefit from a guaranteed salary, and, as a consequence, are felt to be less
legitimate as constitutional actors than their elected counterparts and other political institutions.71
Moreover, the institutional characteristics that help define the judiciary and distinguish it from the
70 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 482 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
71 For an excellent comparison between judicial and legislative processes from a legitimacy standpoint, see

Mikva, supra note 39, at 1828-29. It is perhaps notable that Judge Mikva’s professional activities include
service in all three branches of the federal government.
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legislature also threaten the judiciary’s political legitimacy.72 Finally, passive judicial engagement
can promote democratic goals, principally by granting latitude to the legislative and executive
branches, and by providing room for democratic processes to grow. 73 In other words, passive
judicial activity minimizes the possibility that a court might prematurely terminate public debate
on an issue.74
Practical benefits also flow from passive judicial engagement in the public constitutional
dialogue. For Bickel, the prudent exercise of passive virtues is necessary for the Court’s
performance of its core functions.75 Passive rather than active participation enables the Court
to minimize entanglement with controversial political battles.76 Side-stepping heated political
battles reduces the political fallout aimed at the Court, thereby helping to stabilize the Court’s
delicate constitutional role.77 Passive participation reduces the burdens (or costs) of decisions
by reducing the uncertainty surrounding the future application of a legal rule to new unanticipated
facts or changed circumstances.78 Another benefit is a reduction in judicial error. Judges and
courts can make mistakes, and the likelihood of error increases with the breadth and scope of a
given decision.79 The risk of judicial error is also a function of institutional structure. The
judicial branch in general—and courts in particular—are relatively ill-suited for such tasks as
those incident to policy analysis and risk calculus that typically accompany legal issues that bear
heavily on public policy. This is not to say that Congress or any other constitutional institution
might acquit itself well on any particular policy matter. Rather, the more narrow point is that, ex

72 See generally BICKEL, supra note 2; SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 4; KOMESAR,

supra note 25.
73 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 4, ch.2.
74 Id. at 4; 26-32; James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense of Judicial
Restraint, 71 N.C. L. REV. 805, 836-47 (1993).
75 BICKEL, supra note 2, at 71 (“the Court’s grand function as proclaimer and protector of the goals.”).
76 Schapiro, supra note 7, at 1448.
77 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 4, at 267 n.5.
78 Id. at 47-48.
79 Id. at 49-50.
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ante, comparative institutional analysis suggests that institutions other than the courts might be
structurally better equipped to resolve policy issues, especially ones that involve public
investment and risk assessment.80 If nothing else, the lines of political accountability when
Congress acts are clearer. Through their votes, citizens can directly express their preferences to
Congress on legislative and policy matters.
Professor Paul Tractenberg, long active in the New Jersey school finance litigation,81
identifies institutional credibility as an important practical concern for courts. Tractenberg is
acutely aware of the institutional stakes involved in active judicial participation, particularly
within the school finance setting. On the one hand he reasons that an active judicial posture
might provide political cover for reluctant legislators. After all, politically accountable legislators
could point to the state supreme court and suggest that the justices left them with little choice but
to increase school spending. 82 Such a calculation, Professor Tractenberg correctly notes, risks
depleting the court’s limited and valuable “political capital.”83 He goes on to note that:
[T]here are only so many times that the court [the New Jersey Supreme Court]
can be portrayed as the dictatorial villain forcing the State to do, in the name of
a constitutional mandate, what a majority of its citizens disfavor before judicial
credibility is undermined.84

B. Active Judicial Participation

80 For a fuller discussion of comparative institutional analysis, see KOMESAR, supra note 25.
81 For a detailed biographical account of Professor Tractenberg’s decades-long involvement with the New

Jersey school finance litigation see Paul L. Tractenberg, Using Law to Advance the Public Interest: Rutgers
Law School and Me, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1001 (1999).
82 Notably, New Jersey Supreme Court justices are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent
of the state senate. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 32 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1998-99
136 table 4.4 (1998) [hereinafter BOOK OF THE STATES].
83 Paul L. Tractenberg, A Clear and Powerful Voice for Poor Urban Students: Chief Justice Robert
Wilentz’s Role in Abbott v. Burke, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 719, 743 (1997).
84 Id.
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Proponents of active judicial participation argue that a more engaged judicial branch will
generate an array of goals, including enhanced democracy. Professor Katyal, for example,
argues that courts can enhance democracy, popular sovereignty, separation of powers, and
federalism goals by actively engaging in interbranch constitutional dialogues through advicegiving that includes broad, non-binding opinions.85 If the Court dispensed advice and if
Congress and the Executive branch heeded it, Katyal argues, the need for the Court to engage
in formal judicial review would lessen.86
In addition to theoretical benefits, other, more practical benefits are also predicted as
consequences of active judicial participation. Increased efficiency is one such predicted benefit.
Then law professor—and soon-to-be Justice—Cardozo lamented at what he perceived to be
an absence of formal and regularized interactions between judges and legislators.87 Cardozo’s
primary concern related to legal reform and the deleterious impact that the “separation”
generated, particularly the inefficiencies.88 Professor Schauer notes that increased judicial
dialogue with legislators would improve relations and correspondingly reduce conflicts.89
Finally, Professor Krotoszynski argues that certain benefits would flow from a more candid
acknowledgment of existing levels of judicial participation in interbranch activities.90

IV. STATE SUPREME COURTS AND SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
To gain some insights into the differences between the active and passive models, I
examine examples of both models within a common judicial context. School finance litigation,
specifically the remedial portion of state supreme court decisions, provides this context. As
85 Katyal, supra note 6, at 1715 n.24.
86 Id. at 1711.
87 Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 113-14 (1921).
88 Id. (“The penalty is paid both in the wasted effort of production and the lowered quality of the

product...”.).
89 Frederick Schauer, Refining the Lawmaking Function of the Supreme Court, 17 U. M ICH. J.L. REF . 22, 23
(1983).
90 Krotoszynski, supra note 37, at 9.
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previously discussed, school finance decisions should be receptive to active judicial
participation. I first discuss why state supreme courts are stronger candidates for active judicial
participation than are their federal counterparts. I then turn to why school finance decisions are
an appropriate and relatively favorable test for the active judicial participation model.

A. How State and Article III Courts Differ
State courts differ from Article III courts91 and they do so in a manner that makes state
courts stronger candidates for active judicial participation in interbranch constitutional dialogue.
Stated in the negative, if the active dialogic model does not work in the state supreme court
context, it is less likely to work in the federal setting.

1. Method of Selection and Retention
A critical difference—and one that goes to the core of Bickel’s concerns about countermajoritarian difficulties—relates to differences in how many state and federal judges are
selected. Federal judges, nominated and appointed by the president and confirmed by the
Senate, enjoy life appointments, and are removable only by impeachment.92 Consequently,
federal judges93 remain untouched by direct, first-hand participation electoral processes, at least
as it bears on their judicial commission and tenure on the federal bench. Indeed, one purpose of
the appointive process is to insulate federal judges from majoritarian pressures.94
91 In his classic article, The Myth of Parity, Professor Neuborne advanced the argument that federal courts

are more favorable for litigants seeking to vindicate federal constitutional rights. See Burt Neuborne, The
Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). For responses to and critiques of Neuborne’s argument see
William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST . COMMENT . 599 (1999) (arguing that the
interests of gay rights might be better addressed to state and not federal courts). In contrast, this article
focuses on whether and, if so, how differences separating state and federal courts might implicate their
respective abilities to participate in interbranch constitutional dialogues.
92 U.S. CONST ., art. III, § 1.
93 Specifically, Article III judges.
94 Neuborne, supra note 91, at 1127. This federal judicial independence from political forces and
majoritarian influence is frequently celebrated. See, e.g., Phillip Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of
Federal Judges: Some Notes From History, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 667 (1969) (“Without their
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In contrast, state judges are far closer to electoral and political pressures. Selection and
retention of state judges typically use one (or more) of three broad mechanisms: appointment;
election, either partisan or nonpartisan; and initial appointment followed by retention election.
Approximately 50 percent of state supreme court justices initially are not appointed by the
governor. Approximately 80 percent of state supreme court justices must face some form of
electoral process for retention. 95 Among those justices who are elected, approximately 25
percent participate in partisan elections.96 As a result, state supreme court justices are both in
theory and in practice closer to those people who are influenced by their decisions.
Consequences flow from the close proximity of state judges to electoral and political
processes. Some of these consequences bear on the courts’ comparative abilities to participate
in interbranch dialogues. On the one hand, judges who are more accountable to the electorate
are, presumably, more representative of the electorate and are held to a more direct form of
accountability. Indirect evidence of this point is suggested by results from a survey of state
judges that reveal that 15.4 percent of the respondents reported that retention elections made
them less inclined to take on controversial cases and issue controversial rulings.97 Such
accountability to and access by the citizens to the state judges that preside over them blunt some
of the democratic concerns posed by judicial review.98 On the other hand, the comparatively

independence, the federal judges will have lost all that separates them from total subordination to the
political processes from which they ought to be aloof.”).
95 See BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 82.
96 Id. See also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT
ORGANIZATION 1998 19 (2000).
97 Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306, 31213 (1994). However, seven percent of the responding state judges reported that direct electoral participation
made them more secure to make controversial rulings. Id.
98 Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1072, 1089
(1991)(arguing that because state court judges relatively closer links to those bound by their actions state
courts’ participation in remedial activities pose a correspondingly lesser threat to traditional separation of
powers concerns).
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greater influence of political processes in state judicial affairs might make state judges and
justices more susceptible to majoritarian impulses.99

2. Geography
Simple geographic proximity between state judges and citizens also distinguishes many
state and federal courts. Geographic proximity can fuel dialogue at two distinct levels: an overt,
formal dialogue that plays out in each of the branches’ official workproduct, duties, and
functions, as well as an informal, covert dialogue that takes place in social or non-official
settings.100 Proximity also facilitates informal interactions among a state’s judicial and political
players.101 To the extent that proximity fuels interaction, this interaction should reduce the risk
that the judiciary would be wholly unaware of the competing considerations that state legislators
confront while formulating policy. That is, close geographic proximity increases the likelihood
that each branch is more aware of what the others are doing.
Paradoxically, this increased informal interaction may also reduce the need for formal
dialogue. That is, if proximity accords certain advantages, one such advantage is that the courts
have a better sense of legislators’ actions and concerns. It then follows that the opposite is also
true. If so, it is plausible that there will be less need for formal dialogue because the necessary
information has already passed among the institutional actors.

3. Text, Structure, and History: Differences Between State and Federal Constitutions

99 See, e.g., Daan Braveman, Children, Poverty and State Constitutions, 38 EMORY L.J. 577, 611 (1989);

Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 900 (1989);
Robert Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability:
Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 W ASH . L. REV. 19, 43 (1989).
100 Krotoszynski, supra note 37, at 214.
101 Id. (“State judges, legislators, and executive branch personnel often move in the same circles,
particularly in states with relatively small populations.”).
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Important textual differences distinguish various state constitutions and the federal
constitution, especially as these constitutions address education. The federal constitution does
not include the word “education.” In stark contrast—at least in terms of school finance
litigation—all 50 states’ constitutions speak in some manner to education, typically through an
education clause.102 Yet, state education clauses vary in what they require, and commentators
note four basic groups of clauses.103 The first group of education clauses simply mandates the
establishment of public education.104 Clauses in the second group require that a state provide a
minimal level of educational services or possess some other characteristic such as uniformity.105
A third group mandates a minimum educational quality level, and also articulates other purposes,
usually described by such language as requiring a “thorough and efficient”106 educational
system. The fourth group—and the most stringent from a state’s perspective—explicitly
describes education as a “primary,” “fundamental,” or “paramount” duty of the state
legislature.107

102 See A LA . CONST . art. XIV, § 256; A LASKA CONST . art. VII, § 1; A RIZ . CONST . art. XI, § 1; A RK.

CONST . art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST . art. IX, § 1; COLO . CONST . art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST . art. VIII, § 1;
DEL. CONST . art. X, § 1; FLA . CONST . art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST . art. VIII, § 1; HAW. CONST . art. X, § 1;
IDAHO CONST . art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST . art. X, § 1; IND. CONST . art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST . art. IX, 2d, §
3; KAN. CONST . art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST . § 183; LA. CONST . art. VIII, § 1; M E. CONST . art. VIII, pt.1, § 1;
M D. CONST . art. VIII, § 1; M ASS. CONST . pt.2, ch.5, § 2; M ICH. CONST . art. VIII, § 2; M INN. CONST . art.
XIII, § 1; M ISS. CONST . art. 8, § 201; M O. CONST . art. IX, § 1(a); M ONT . CONST . art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST .
art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST . art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST . pt.2, art. LXXXIII; N.J. CONST . art. VIII, § 4; N.M.
CONST . art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST . art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST . art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST . art. VIII, § 1; OHIO
CONST . art. VI, § 2; OKLA . CONST . art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST . art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST . art. III, § 14; R.I.
CONST . art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST . art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST . art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST . art. XI, § 12; TEX .
CONST . art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST . art. X, § 1; VT . CONST . ch.2, § 68; VA. CONST . art. VIII, § 1; W ASH .
CONST . art. IX, § 1; W.VA. CONST . art. XII, § 1; W IS. CONST . art. X, § 3; W YO. CONST . art. VII, § 1.
103 Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills,
63 TEX . L. REV. 777, 814-16 (1985) (describing four groups of education clauses classified as descriptions of
general education, quality of education, specific mandates, and strongest commitment to education).
104 See, e.g., CONN . CONST . art. VIII, § 1.
105 See, e.g., A RK. CONST . art. XIV, § 1.
106 See, e.g., N.J. CONST . art. VIII, § 4; OHIO CONST . art. VI, § 2. William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During
the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597,
606 n. 57 (1994) (stating that education clauses in New Jersey and Ohio are similarly categorized as
“Category II” type education clauses).
107 See, e.g., ILL. CONST . art. X, § 1.
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Structural and historical factors also distinguish the federal and state constitutions. One
structural difference involves malleability. It is easier to amend state constitutions than it is to
amend the federal Constitution.108 Consequently, state supreme court interpretations of state
constitutional laws are comparatively less secure than the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the United States Constitution. This fuels the perception that state residents
are better equipped to rectify perceived errors in state constitutional interpretation. 109
Moreover, this perception supports the argument that state constitutional interpretation by state
judges can be more aggressive and active because, when state supreme courts venture “too
far,” citizens have more direct political access to state judges and greater ability to amend state
constitutions.110
Another structural point involves the different institutional roles performed by federal
and state courts within their respective constitutional regimes. Notably, some state supreme
courts are not limited to deciding “cases and controversies”111 and thus issue advisory
opinions.112 This tilts the balance of power in state governments further towards the courts.
Commentators also note that the “history of state constitutionalism is marked by a gradual shift
in power from the legislative branch to the executive branch and judiciary, reflecting a growing
distrust for state legislatures.”113
History also appears to play a role in distinguishing state and federal constitutionalism.
The origins of many state constitutions benefit from more and more direct citizen participation.
108 Lawrence Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and Political Culture:

A Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 269, 277 (1994).
109 Id. at 272 (arguing that a positive correlation exists between ease of state constitutional amendment and
level of state judicial activism).
110 Michael D. Blanchard, The New Judicial Federalism: Deference Masquerading as Discourse and the
Tyranny of Locality in State Judicial Review of Education Finance, 60 U. PITT . L. REV. 231, 260 (1998)
(“The relative ease of state constitutional amendment supports an active an expansive judicial
interpretation. . . .”).
111 U.S. CONST ., art. III § 2.
112 See, e.g., Carberry, supra note 41.
113 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutions in the Federal System 62-63
(1989)[hereinafter Advisory Commission].
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For example, Justice Feldman of the Arizona Supreme Court notes that Arizonians selected
their state constitutional delegates by a vote.114 In contrast, delegates to the Federal
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 were sent by state legislators. Moreover,
Arizonians voted to ratify their state constitution directly, unlike the state conventions that were
used to ratify the federal Constitution.115 As a consequence, commentators note that state
constitutions might better reflect the citizens’ views than does the federal Constitution.116
The cumulative weight of these differences reduces the traditional threats generated by
active judicial participation in the broader constitutional dialogue by state supreme court
justices.117 Thus, if active judicial participation in constitutional dialogue is sensible, it should
make the most sense for state courts.

B. School Finance Litigation
One critical question is whether court decisions involving school finance might elucidate
competing models of judicial engagement and, if so, whether they are a fair test of the models.
State supreme courts play a pivotal role in the debate over school finance reform. Some form
of litigation challenging state school funding systems has reached the state supreme court in 40
states.118 Of those 40 state supreme court decisions, approximately 40 percent (17) resulted in
decisions favorable to those challenging school finance systems.119 Although the states have
114 Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Abney, The Double Security of Federalism: Protecting Individual

Liberty Under the Arizona Constitution, 20 A RIZ . ST . L.J. 115, 145 (1988).
115 Id.
116 See, e.g., Blanchard, supra note 110, at 261-65 (arguing that state courts should more aggressively
protect individual rights).
117 Id. at 265.
118 David Long, Status of School Finance Constitutional Litigation (accessed Feb. 2, 2000)
<http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/litigation/status.asp>.
119 These 17 include: Opinion of Justices, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66
v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest,
487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass.
1993); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor,
703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio
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litigated school finance issues for more than two decades, resolutions to many complicated
questions remain elusive. As a result, school finance litigation will assuredly continue into the
future.120 A review of the school finance decisions handed down during the past decades
demonstrates two themes. One involves how school finance litigation theory has evolved,
thereby influencing the nature of judicial opinions. A second theme relates to a contrast
between the courts’ sense of their institutional roles in the articulation of a state constitutional
right involving education, and their roles in remedying violations of that right.
Most scholars organize the growing number of school finance decisions into three
distinct waves.121 The initial two waves focus on equitable concerns arising from disparities in
per-pupil spending. Per-pupil spending disparities exist in districts that rely substantially on local
property taxes for their funding source. All but two states (as well as the District of Columbia)
draw heavily from local property taxes for school funding.122 Property values vary across all

1997); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tx. 1989); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1984); Washakie County Sch. Dist.
No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
120 Scholarly attention to school finance litigation—already high—will likely increase in the future. The
number of law review articles, comments, and notes addressing school finance issues is large, to say the
least. Underscoring the increased scholarly attention to this topic are peer-reviewed and faculty-edited
scholarly journals that devote significant attention to school finance and related issues. See generally J.
EDUC. FIN. and J. L. & EDUCATION. Also, special or symposium law review issues, such as 28 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. (1991) and 35 B.C. L. REV. (1994), focus on school finance. Finally, it is important to note that
one of the panels at the University of Virginia School of Law’s Symposium on Equal Education Under the
Law (Feb. 6-7, 1998) focused on school finance reform.
121 See Thro, supra note 106, at 598 n.4 (claiming ownership over “the idea of waves of litigation.”). As
Thro notes, the idea has been reiterated by others. See, e.g., Michael Heise, Equal Opportunity and
Constitutional Theory: Preliminary Thoughts on the Role of School Choice and the Autonomy Principle,
14 J. L. & POL. 411, 425 (1998). See also Gail Levine, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to
Recent Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 507-08 (1991) (describing three waves
of school finance litigation); Julie K. Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New
Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 520-35 (1991)(describing three different approaches in
addressing challenges to state school finance systems).
It is important to note that at least one commentator has called for the recognition of a fourth wave.
See Kevin R. McMillian, The Turning Tide: The Emerging Fourth Wave of School Finance Reform
Litigation and the Courts’ Lingering Institutional Concerns, 58 OHIO ST . L.J. 1867 (1998).
122 Hawaii and the District of Columbia each operate a single or unified school system for their citizens. In
1993, Michigan decided to replace a property tax with a sales tax as the core for school funding. See
Michael F. Addonizio et al., Michigan’s High Wire Act, 20 J. EDUC. FIN. 235 (1995) (discussing ramifications
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states and, not surprisingly, per-pupil spending levels reflect this variation. Indeed,
discrepancies in per-pupil spending levels persist even after adjustment for varying levels in
taxing efforts.123 The earlier equity-based school finance lawsuits sought, in part, to reduce
per-pupil spending gaps.
The third and current wave of school finance decisions emerged in 1989.124 Rather
than focusing on per-pupil spending gaps or total educational funding levels, adequacy-based
lawsuits instead emphasized the adequacy or quality of educational services provided. As a
result, adequacy-based school finance litigants have prevailed not because of any per-pupil
funding disparities, but because the quality of education delivered to schoolchildren failed to
meet a state constitutionally mandated minimum.125
The shift from equity- to adequacy-based school finance decisions helped to broaden
the equal educational opportunity doctrine. Equal education opportunity today, and certainly
when cast in litigation terms, frequently is defined from a perspective of educational adequacy
rather than race. School finance decisions striking down state school finance systems typically
point to a failure to deliver basic academic skills to students.126 Once such a failure is identified,
courts increasingly make clear that it is the school districts’ task to present students with a
of the Michigan legislature’s decision to eliminate local property tax base as a source of public school
revenue).
123 For a more thorough discussion of the relation between per-pupil spending levels and taxing efforts, see
generally Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation and the “Third Wave”: From
Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1151 (1995).
124 See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W. 2d 186 (Ky. 1989). See also Helena Elementary Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
125 James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE. L. J. 249 (1999). As Professor Ryan correctly
notes, not all cases decided after the 1989 Rose decision reflected the shift from equity to adequacy. See id.
at 268 n.82. Of course, Professor Ryan goes on to also note that “for the most part” the shift from equity to
adequacy took place during this third wave of school finance decisions. Id.
126 In Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., the Kentucky Supreme Court identified seven basic educational
needs to include sufficient: (i) oral and written communication skills; (ii) knowledge of economic, social and
political systems; (iii) understanding of governmental processes; (iv) self-knowledge and knowledge of his
or her mental and physical wellness; (v) grounding in the arts; (vi) training or preparation for advanced
training in either academic or vocational fields; and (vii) Levels of academic or vocational skills to enable
public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or
in the job market. 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
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meaningful opportunity to achieve basic academic skills. One implicit assumption is that training
in these skills, ensured by state constitutions, must be provided almost regardless of cost.127 In
many instances—but not all—minority students and students from low-income households bear
the brunt of inadequate educational services.128 Thus, most current discussions about how to
improve equal educational opportunity for those most in need dwell on educational adequacy, a
concept frequently construed through school finance litigation.

1. School Finance Court Decisions: Rights versus Remedies
Another key reason that school finance lawsuits provide helpful insights into competing
models of judicial engagement flows from the structure of the court decisions themselves.
Specifically, some state supreme courts display much greater engagement with the task of
defining a constitutional right than with the task of outlining a particular remedy. The research
literature benefits from a rich discussion about possible distinctions between legal rights and

127 And the costs can be considerable. One commentator notes that the Rose decision in Kentucky

resulted in new tax legislation that increased revenues by more than one billion dollars. Revenues for all
Kentucky school districts increased by at least eight percent and, in some districts, up to 25 percent. See
Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative Authority: The Kentucky Case, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 341, 343 n.12 (1991). The recent case Campbell County School District v. State, 907
P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995), adds another dimension to this broad point. The court in Campbell wrote that
“competing priorities not of constitutional magnitude are secondary [to education], and the legislature may
not yield to them until a sufficient provision is made for elementary and secondary education.” Id. at 1279.
Thus, the court constructs what amounts to a preference for education over all other claims to state dollars.
128 It is important to note that I use the term “inadequate” rather than “inequitable,” given how these two
terms are commonly used in this context. This distinction becomes important when one considers that data
presented by the U.S. Department of Education suggest that, from a per-pupil spending perspective, more
educational funds are spent on a per-pupil basis in school districts with high concentrations of minority
students than in districts with lower concentrations of minority students. Put slightly differently, a
“positive relationship between the percentage of minority students and expenditures in a district” exists,
“when factors are equal.” See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DISPARITIES IN
PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT SPENDING 1989-90, 13-16 tbl.1 (1995). Of course, as the school finance
adequacy theory suggests, just because some minority students in some school districts may benefit from
relatively high per-pupil spending, the education they receive might nonetheless still be constitutionally
inadequate. Interestingly, the opposite relationship is found for students from low-income families. That is
to say, a statistically negative relation exists between the percentage of schoolchildren from low-income
households and per-pupil educational spending. Id. at 16-17 tbl.2.
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remedies.129 The scope of this literature cuts across an array of legal areas. The swath includes
school finance litigation. Commentators note that even victorious plaintiffs in school finance
lawsuits sometimes emerge with less than full satisfaction from the legal remedy provided.130
Various reasons explain why some state courts approach the rights and remedies
implicated in school finance cases differently. One commentator notes that the gap separating
right and remedy in the school finance context flows from fundamental conflicts between the
successful plaintiffs and the institutions that they sued.131 Other explanations rely on the political
influence of wealthy school districts that stand to lose school funding in a legislative action the
redistributes school dollars.132 Regardless of the precise explanations, the appropriateness of
using school finance decisions as a test of competing models of judicial participation
presupposes that some school finance decisions exhibit a distinction between the constitutional
right sought and the forthcoming remedy.
Although a full theoretical exposition on the distinction between rights and remedies is
beyond the scope of this article, the issue warrants brief discussion. According to Professor
Levinson, the notion that rights and remedies occupy different conceptual and real space is
consistent with a rights-essentialist theory.133 Not only are rights and remedies distinct
concepts, but remedies are subordinate to—or a subsidiary of—rights.134 The distinction

129 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 11, at 44-58; Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial

Equilibration, 99 COLUM . L. REV. 857, 870-72 (1999); PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 26-28
(1983).
130 For an empirical analysis see Michael Heise, State Constitutional Litigation, Educational Finance, and
Legal Impact: An Empirical Analysis, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1735 (1995) (noting the inability of successful
equity-based school finance lawsuits to increase state education spending) [hereinafter State
Constitutional Litigation]; Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the
Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Explanation, 32 GEO. L. REV. 545
(1998) (arguing that one reason for the theoretical shift from equity with adequacy in school finance
litigation theory is the inefficacious successful equity-based lawsuits) [hereinafter Equal Educational
Opportunity].
131 Note, supra note 98, at 1078.
132 Id.
133 Levinson, supra note 129, 870-72.
134 See generally Fiss, supra note 11, at 44-58.
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between rights and remedies is in many ways parallel to Professor Dworkin’s distinction
between arguments of principle and policy.135 In such a world, a world in which rights and
remedies (or principles and policies) occupy distinct space, judges would have primary
jurisdiction over rights, and legislatures would have a corresponding jurisdiction over remedies.
A court seeking to participate actively in the public constitutional dialogue would actively
interact with the legislative (and executive) branches in the remedial areas. A court seeking
passive dialogue would not do this.
A gap exists between the willingness of some state courts to articulate individual rights
relating to education and their willingness to participate more forcefully and actively in the
remedial process.136 One crucial question is why courts might elect to cede their bold voice in
remedial affairs. Answers to this question provide insight into a court’s approach toward
judicial participation in constitutional dialogue.
One answer involves the courts’ institutional interest that flows from the uncertainty
accompanying such a judicial effort. Even if the courts choose to become engaged in the
constitutional dialogue surrounding Supreme Court school finance decisions which invalidate
school funding schemes, it is not clear whether such judicial engagement can alter the course of
future events, at least in ways desired by the plaintiffs. Given the institutional stakes implicated
by such a judicial move, the possibility of outright failure might give some state courts pause.
Why pick a potential constitutional fight when the outcome is not obvious?
Finally, the nature of the typical task at hand in the school finance context makes an
already difficult task even more so. In most school finance cases, the constitutional challenge
flows less from what the state legislature has done and more from what the legislature has not
135 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82-84, 90 (1977) (“Arguments of principle are

arguments intended to establish an individual right; arguments of policy are arguments intended to
establish a collective goal. Principles are propositions that describe rights; policies are propositions that
describe goals.”). Professor Levinson concludes that “Dworkin’s principle/policy distinction roughly lines
up with the rights/remedy distinction. Levinson, supra note 129, at 872.
136 Detailed examples illustrating this point are considered in Part IV.B.3, infra.
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done. State court participation in an effort to overcome legislative inertia is more intrusive than a
judicial participation in an effort to get state lawmakers to cease doing something.137

2. School Finance Court Decisions as a Test of Judicial Participation Models
School finance decisions are not only a fair test of the active judicial participation model,
but are also likely slanted in its favor. Because the stakes can be significant, plaintiffs seeking
judicial assistance in influencing education policy and spending are even more inclined to pursue
a litigation strategy in the first instance, as well as to seek an active judicial role. The policy and
economic stakes posed by school finance litigation and the attendant allocation of state
resources are significant. State spending on public primary and secondary education accounts
for one of the largest single segments of a state’s annual budget. Thus, court decisions
influencing state spending on education invariably influence state spending in other areas, at least
indirectly. After all, a court order to increase educational spending will almost always result in
another claimant on state resources receiving fewer resources or taxpayers contributing more
money, or both.
Paradoxically, while the potentially significant policy and economic stakes provide
incentive for a litigation strategy, the enormity of the stakes implicated by such a lawsuit works
against the likelihood that a successful school finance lawsuit will achieve its stated goals.
Moreover, the underlying complexities of school finance also work against court efforts to
influence education spending. School finance involves multiple institutions and variables.138
Their interactions—along with those of a host of other variables—make judicial efforts seeking
to influence school spending difficult. Indeed, empirical studies of the efficacy of various school

137 Note, supra, note 98, at 1082.
138 For examples of models of education spending see Equal Educational Opportunity, supra note 130;

State Constitutional Litigation, supra note 130.
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finance decisions underscore the uncertainty surrounding what judicial opinions can accomplish
with respect to education spending. 139

3. School Finance Litigation: Models of Judicial Engagement
a. Active Judicial Participation: New Jersey
No example of the active judicial participation model is perhaps more notorious than the
three-decade saga surrounding school finance litigation in New Jersey. This litigation has been
described by even those who are partial towards the court’s involvement as a “war”140
involving two technically distinct, but related, lawsuits: Robinson v. Cahill141 and Abbott v.
Burke.142 It is, of course, difficult to summarize succinctly the dialogue—constitutional or
otherwise—that surrounded New Jersey’s legal battles with school finance reform. These
battles have inspired entire books, and even those books convey only parts of a multi-faceted
and complex story. 143 That said, a few broad themes emerge that are particularly salient to the
court’s participation in the constitutional dialogue that surrounded the litigation effort.
The initial decision in Robinson was announced just two weeks after the United States
Supreme Court rejected a similar challenge, rooted in the Federal Equal Protection Clause, that

139 See, e.g., Equal Educational Opportunity, supra note 130 (finding relatively little evidence of

successful equity-based school finance lawsuits). But cf. Sheila E. Murray et al., Education-Finance
Reform and the Distribution of Education Resources, 88 A MER. ECON. REV. 789 (1998) (arguing that
successful school finance lawsuits positively impact school funding levels).
140 Tractenberg, supra note 81, at 1006.
141 See Robinson v. Cahill, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976); Robinson
v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 339 A.2d
193 (N.J. 1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973);
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 289 A.2d 569 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972);
Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
142 See Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998); Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997); Abbott v.
Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994); Abbott v. Burke, 636 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1993); Abbott v. Burke, No. 91-C-00150,
1993 WL 379818 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Aug. 13, 1993); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Abbott
v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985); Abbott v. Burke, 483 A.2d 187 (N.J. 1984); Abbott v. Burke, 477 A.2d 1278
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984). As of this writing, the Abbott litigation remains pending.
143 See, e.g., RICHARD LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE (1978).
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the Texas school finance system faced.144 The New Jersey court in Robinson was among the
first to expansively articulate the application of the equal education opportunity doctrine in the
school finance context,145 as well as to link educational outcomes to economic and citizenship
outcomes. The central analytical contribution of Robinson was its rejection of Equal Protection
Clause analysis and its embracing of the New Jersey Constitution’s “thorough and efficient”
language contained in the state’s educational clause.146 One critical question was how to define
“thorough and efficient” for constitutional purposes in the education context. Notably, the New
Jersey court elected not to construe “thorough and efficient” to mean “equal resources.”147
Rather, the court chose to interpret these words to mean that the state must provide equal
educational opportunity.148 Of course, the court confronted additional definition problems
relating to equal educational opportunity. Compounding the court’s task is that neither the
legislative nor the executive branches of New Jersey’s government had articulated what equal
educational opportunity meant in this context. Rather than permit the coordinate branches to
respond, the court operationalized a definition with respect to the requirements for participation
as an informed citizen, as well as participation in the labor market.149
Between 1973 and 1976, the Robinson litigation was consumed by remedial efforts.
Specifically, a tug-of-war began between the court and New Jersey lawmakers over a new
school finance system that would pass state constitutional muster. What emerged in 1975 was
the Public School Education Act that, the court concluded, was facially neutral.150 However, in

144 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
145 For more on the relation between the equal education opportunity doctrine and school finance, see

generally Heise, supra note 121.
146 N.J. CONST ., art. VIII, § IV, par. 1 (“The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State
between the ages of five and eighteen years.”).
147 Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (N.J. 1973).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 295-96.
150 Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975).
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the opinion, many justices openly aired serious misgivings about whether the Act would be
constitutional once it was applied.151 Some of the justices were quite blunt with their warnings
that, if the Act did not produce constitutionally acceptable results in practice, the court would
welcome further legal challenges.152 This challenge, almost invited by the court, arrived five
years later in Abbott v. Burke.153
In many respects, the Abbott litigation reflects the consistent progression established
earlier by the Robinson decisions. In other respects, however, the two pieces of litigation
demonstrate quite distinct threads. Abbott reflects the court’s simultaneous contraction and
expansion of its role in the dialogue that had consumed many New Jersey lawmakers and
citizens. Abbott significantly expanded the judicial scope, but targeted the court’s effort at
fewer and more discrete school districts. The court veered off of its initial track of trying to
influence school policy for all New Jersey schoolchildren. In its place, the court endeavored to
improve the educational opportunities of the least advantaged students, principally those of
minority students from low-income households attending racially identifiable urban schools.
Moreover, the court re-inserted the resource issue into the definition of “equal educational
opportunity.” Specifically, the court demanded that students in low-income urban districts
receive per-pupil spending levels substantially equivalent to the levels received by their more
affluent suburban counterparts. In addition to resource equalization, the court concluded that
the low-income students’ special educational needs must also be addressed.154 The dialogue
among New Jersey’s lawmakers, governor, and Supreme Court now spans more than four
decades.

b. Active Judicial Participation: Texas
151 See Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129, 139 (N.J. 1976).
152 See id.
153 Abbott v. Burke, 477 A.2d 1278 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
154 Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 385 (N.J. 1985).
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If New Jersey’s experience is the most notorious, than Texas’ experience is a close
second. One observer close to the multi-decade school finance litigation battle waged in Texas
likened the ordeal to a Russian novel: “It’s long, tedious, and everybody dies in the end.”155
Similar to what happened in New Jersey, the Texas Supreme Court, over time and through its
decisions, became intimately intertwined with school finance reform to a self-conscious degree.
Even supporters of school finance reform and the court’s role in it recognize that:
[the] structure and process of the long “conversation” and the [Texas] capitol
exhibited the incremental, some would say questionable, entanglement of the
two branches of government over the course of the Edgewood drama.156
This “conversation” initially involved whether Texas courts should decide such a case
because it was feared that the underlying issue was more political than it was legal.157 The
Texas Supreme Court quickly disposed of any separation-of-powers concerns and, in so doing,
opened a door that Texas courts walked through. 158 Although it was ultimately concluded that
the Texas courts indeed had a role to play, the precise nature of the role was initially undefined.
When the Edgewood line of decisions is considered in its entirety, however, what emerges is a
picture of a court that occupies a progressively more intrusive role; one intimately and directly
engages with the legislative and executive branches.
In Edgewood I, the Texas court did little more than to declare the state school funding
system unconstitutional and order the legislature to fix it.159 In the next wave of decisions, the
Texas court again struck down the legislative response. The judicial opinion included strongly

155 Mark Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 499

(1991).
156 J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for Education Equity, 17
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 607, 710 (1999).
157 Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 867 (Tex. App. 1988) [hereinafter Edgewood I].
158 Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989).
159 Id. at 399 (“The legislature has primary responsibility to decide how to best achieve an efficient
system.”).
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suggestive language and broached such topics as “tax base consolidation.”160 The trend of
increased court involvement persisted and deepened. The Edgewood III opinion was laden
with highly technical policy language incident to school finance nuances, worthy of the most
sophisticated of policy wonks. The Texas court disassembled another legislative response and
made further legislative proposals.161 Finally, in the fourth piece of litigation, Edgewood IV, the
Texas Supreme Court approved the legislative response and, in the opinion, self-consciously
remarked that its role is only “to determine whether the Legislature has complied with the
Constitution.”162 To some, the Court’s description of its role in the arduous process reflected a
court either “exercising a fine sense of irony or wallowing in a profound state of denial.”163

c. Passive Judicial Participation: Massachusetts
Unlike the state supreme courts’ active involvement in New Jersey and Texas, the
experience in Massachusetts exemplifies the passive model. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court’s treatment of a challenge to that state’s school finance system illustrates how
courts, as an institution, can be far more deferential in the remedial aspect of school finance
decisions than in the articulation of the underlying state constitutional right to education.
The plaintiffs in McDuffy,164 including sixteen separate Massachusetts school districts,
asserted that the educational opportunities offered were not adequate, particularly when
compared to what was offered in other more affluent school districts.165 In interpreting the
state’s education clause, the court found the source for rights owed to individuals as well as

160 Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 498 (Tex. 1991) [hereinafter Edgewood II].
161 Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 491, 504-10

(Tex. 1992) [hereinafter Edgewood III].
162 Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 747 (Tex. 1995) [hereinafter Edgewood IV].
163 Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 156, at 713. Indeed, these commentators conclude that the Texas
Supreme Court did, in fact, “assume a supervisory role.” Id. at 714.
164 McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
165 Id. at 553.
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obligations upon the legislature.166 The court also looked carefully at the array of relevant state
statutes and noted the state’s long history and practice of local control. However,
notwithstanding the tradition of local control, the court concluded that the state could not
delegate its duty to educate and, therefore, retained ultimate responsibility for education. 167
Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were not receiving the constitutionally required
level of education.
After concluding that the Massachusetts Constitution established a duty for the state to
educate its citizens and that the state failed in its duty as it related to the plaintiffs, the court then
turned to the question of remedy. This section of the court’s opinion contrasts sharply both in
substance and in form with the earlier section in which the court established a duty of care and
discussed how the state had breached it. First, the remedy section of the court’s opinion is
rather brief.168 Somewhat oddly, portions of the remedy section of the opinion dwell on dicta
from the Kentucky Supreme Court’s Rose decision.169 Second, the tone of the remedy portion
of the McDuffy decision reveals marked institutional hesitance. The Massachusetts court
previously cited Marbury v. Madison170 for the proposition that it is the court’s role to
interpret the constitution in the rights section, but, when it came to a remedy, the court decidedly
backed away from its earlier active posture. According to Professor Brown, the successful
plaintiffs came away from the decision with “a nice sounding declaration” of a fundamental right.
However, the victory was short-lived because, in the decision’s remedial section, the court
“essentially remitted [the plaintiffs] to the legislature which caused their problem in the first
place.”171 Thus, according to another commentator, after declaring that a state constitutional
166 Id. at 548.
167 Id. at 553.
168 Compare McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 516-53 with McDuffy, 615 N.E. 2d at 554-56.
169 Id. at 554 (quoting Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 N.E.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)).
170 Id. at 611 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803)).
171 George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts Perspective on the State School

Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543, 544 (1994).
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right was infringed by the state’s school funding scheme, the courts turn over to the state
legislatures the task of formulating a proper remedy.172
Perhaps this is a price for state constitutional peace. The McDuffy opinion does not
appear to satisfy wholly either the plaintiffs or the defendants. The plaintiffs succeeded in
gaining an articulated standard of educational care, as well as a ruling that the state had failed to
discharge its affirmative constitutional obligations. However, in the same opinion the court,
rather than fashion a judicially crafted remedy, essentially handed to Massachusetts lawmakers
the technical matter of revising the state school finance mechanism to conform to state
constitutional requirements. Although it remains unclear whether school districts have improved
in Massachusetts to the satisfaction of the prevailing plaintiffs, what is clear is that Massachusetts
avoided the acrimonious political “warfare” that emerged in New Jersey and Texas.

V. CONCLUSION
A critical point bears repeating: the issue is not whether courts will participate in the
nation’s constitutional dialogue, but rather what form the courts’ participation should take.
How the courts participate raises important normative questions that reside at the heart of
constitutional structure and democratic rule. This article considers two general models of
judicial participation: active and passive, and it does so within a particular judicial context—
school finance litigation. Variation in the state supreme courts’ approaches to school finance
remedies provides a quasi-experimental design to observe differences in the active and passive
judicial models. The results of a brief analysis of three states’ experiences provide support for
the passive model of judicial participation. That the particular judicial context used in this
analysis—state supreme courts and school finance litigation—is favorable to the active model
makes the (contrary) results even more interesting. Of course, given the limited nature of this
172 Jonathan Banks, Note, State Constitutional Analyses of Public School Finance Reform Cases: Myth or

Methodology?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 129, 156 (1992).
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study, it is difficult to over-emphasize the narrowness of these results. Whether these results
inform other areas of educational law or other judicial settings is unclear. Such questions would
benefit from future study.
How courts approach the nation’s constitutional dialogue has important consequences.
The experiences in New Jersey and Texas, unlike the experience in Massachusetts, illustrate the
potential for courts to become entangled in a quagmire of battles with other constitutional actors
and institutions from which no real victors are likely to emerge, or to emerge unscathed. Such
episodes threaten to erode democratic processes in numerous ways.
In addition to a threat to constitutional structure and notions about separation of
powers, active judicial participation can also trigger more practical consequences. First, courts
might gain for the plaintiffs less than what they might gain from lawmakers if lawmakers were
forced to guess at what courts require. Where courts adopt an active posture in school finance
disputes, they typically set forth baseline constitutional requirements. State lawmakers, perhaps
displeased at having the courts strike down their earlier legislative efforts, might be inclined to
respond to the strict mandates advanced by the courts and then do nothing more. In contrast,
by simply striking existing legislation and remaining silent about the minimal level necessary to
meet constitutional standards, a court, through a passive posture, can keep lawmakers guessing
about what is required. If the lawmakers guess incorrectly and respond unacceptably, the court
can again invalidate the legislation. All that is lost is time, effort, and energy. If, on the other
hand, lawmakers respond with an effort that exceeds that which the court internally felt was
necessary, the plaintiffs will have benefited from this asymmetrical information. That is, where
the court forces lawmakers to guess at constitutional minimums, it preserves the possibility that
lawmakers may guess higher than what state constitutions require.
Second, active judicial participation in the school finance area might indirectly
exacerbate one problem that it seeks to solve. One problem that arises in the school finance
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context involves legislative inertia. The question is how courts should approach and respond to
instances of legislative inertia, assuming that such a condition is easily recognizable. By seeking
to address an issue by actively and directly engaging lawmakers, courts may ultimately “solve”
one inertia problem, but they will do so in a manner that will fuel additional inertia problems in
the future. Specifically, active judicial participation often provides political “cover” for
lawmakers eager to avoid tough—and possibly divisive—political questions that sometimes
occupy the center of the political process. Once lawmakers see that judges are willing to inject
themselves into political debates, some lawmakers might be induced to become more, rather
than less, complacent. Moreover, once the judiciary becomes engaged with a political problem,
it becomes part of that problem. To the extent that such problems might not go away anytime
soon or, for that matter, worsen, the judiciary’s institutional credibility could become an issue.
Of course, the likely costs of a court adopting a passive approach are also unpalatable.
Specifically, problems—both theoretical and practical—arise when courts clearly articulate a
constitutional right that for whatever reason defies an adequate constitutional remedy.
However, if the remedial component of a problem flows from lawmakers who are not
discharging their legislative obligations, a less structurally stressful answer resides in the political
rather than in the legal domain—at least within the specific context of school finance litigation.
Legislatures that fail to adhere to judicially articulated constitutional school finance requirements
create important problems that harm schoolchildren, among others. Such problems demand
immediate and sustained attention. However, to address that problem by having a state
supreme court actively engage itself in the formulation of a political solution risks making a
regrettable situation even worse. Simply put, the risks generated by active judicial participation
in school finance problems are too high.
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